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The shift in focus from entities to process in organizational theory is both 
theoretically challenging and rich in potential. In this chapter I first consider two 
major challenges to the traditional science of organizations, including a shift 
from research devoted to establishing empirically based covering laws to a 
science invested in generating futures through participatory practices. I then 
consider a theoretical orientation to process, one that illuminates the 
collaborative or co‐active constitution of what we take to be entities, and the 
ongoing process required to sustain a world of independent events or actions. 
Finally, with this emphasis on co‐active process in place, I take up the possibility 
of understanding organizational activity in terms of confluence theory. The latter 
emphasizes wholistic collations of co‐constituting “entities” that are in motion 
across time. Such an orientation to understanding invites the scholar to engage 
in future building activities that are sensitized to the protean potentials for 
organizational re‐constitution.
Keywords:   relational theory, confluence, process theory, co‐action
By cosmic rule, as day yields night, so winter becomes summer, war 
becomes peace, and plenty gives way to famine. Fire penetrates the lump 
of myrrh, until the fire and myrrh die away, but to rise again in the smoke 
called incense.
Heraclitus
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It is noteworthy that we generally recognize only a handful of philosophers— 
Heraclitus, Bergson, and Whitehead among them—whose writings privilege  (p. 
56) ongoing process over stable substances or structure. Perhaps this should 
not be surprising. The major concerns of Western philosophy have long been 
toward establishing durable foundations—for knowledge, morality, political 
practices, aesthetics, and so on. In a world of process, however, there is little 
reason to seek enduring foundations. Indeed, it is difficult to identify the kinds of 
substantial entities the understanding of which would require foundations. The 
search for knowledge requires an object of study.
Organizational science is largely a benefactor of the tradition of substances. 
That is, it was born in the wake of a philosophy seeking foundations for 
knowledge of an enduring subject matter. In effect, one may trace the 
beginnings of organizational science to the twentieth‐century philosophy of 
science, and its attempt to generate viable foundations for empirical research. 
The longstanding belief that sustained research will lead to increments in 
knowledge of the organization, and that deductions from such knowledge will 
favor a progressive flourishing of organizational efficacy, has been a touchstone 
of the discipline. Thus, in entertaining the possibility of an alternative 
metaphysics—one that replaces the assumption of enduring entities with a vision 
of continuous process—we find ourselves crossing a threshold into largely 
unexplored territory. If process is in the forefront, how might we envision our 
subject matter, the process of inquiry, and the possible implications for world 
practices?
These are complex issues, pregnant with possibility, and the dialogues now 
exploring the potentials for a process orientation to organizational study are 
much to be welcomed. In the present chapter, I wish to offer three inter‐related 
entries into this dialogue. First, I will take up the more general question of what 
might follow if a process perspective were to be embraced by organizational 
science. How radical are these departures; what promise do they hold? With 
these preliminary remarks in hand, I will outline a process‐oriented departure 
that has, for me, opened up a new and exciting range of inquiry. My starting 
point in this case will be a concern with the relational generation of meaning. 
Finally, I will briefly sketch an alternative to traditional causal explanation in 
organizational science. The focus here will be on relational confluence.
4.1 An organizational science without organizations?
The word, organization, is a noun and it is also a myth. If one looks for an 
organization one will not find it. What we will find is that there are events, 
linked together, that will transpire within concrete walls,  (p.57) and these 
sequences, their pathways, their timing, are the forms we erroneously 
make into substances when we talk about organizations.
Karl Weick
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The presumption of enduring entities is pivotal to the traditional science of 
organizations. Without presuming the substantive existence of “the 
organization,” there would be little in the way of a science. How is it possible to 
embrace a process orientation and sustain any form of science as we know it? In 
my view, a fully developed process orientation would indeed require alterations 
in our traditional view of behavioral science. Many of these would be radical 
departures. However, science is not itself a stable institution, and its beliefs and 
practices have not only changed over the centuries, but in markedly different 
directions depending on the discipline. In this sense, one might well see the shift 
in physics from a Newtonian to a quantum paradigm as illustrating the 
potentials inherent in moving from an entity to a process based cosmology. In 
effect, as we shift assumptions so do we stand to open up new theoretical, 
methodological, and practical avenues of scientific activity. At the same time, 
major shifts in orientation such as this are not easily achieved. What are 
required are the difficult tasks of self‐reflexive critique, imagining alternatives, 
and working through the potentials and shortcomings of various practices. In 
what follows, I briefly center on three areas of potential transformation, and 
their implications:
4.2 The challenge of pure process
If we replace entities as the focus of concern with process, we are sensitized at 
the outset to cross‐time configurations. It is not the metaphors of the 
organization as a pyramid or a machine that are compelling, for example, so 
much as metaphors of turbulent streams or conversational flows. Put in these 
terms, however, we can distinguish differences along a dimension varying from 
conservative to more radical images of process. More conservative orientations 
have been present since the inception of the discipline. We have long theorized, 
for example, that organizational functioning depends on a set of continuous bi‐ 
causal relations among various organizational entities (e.g. groups or 
individuals). Most systems theories embody such a view. And organizational 
development has long been viewed as movement from an existing (and less than 
optimal) condition to a more favorable one. However, such accounts are 
conservative in  (p.58) their dependence on conceptions of bounded and stable 
states or entities. In the case of systems formulations, for instance, one typically 
posits entities or states which interact, and in most organizational development 
sequences one moves from one bounded and identifiable state to another.
Karl Weick was perhaps among the first to propose a more radical form of 
process theory (Weick, 1995). His study of the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 
1993) provides an excellent illustration of how understanding expands when we 
broaden our vision of process. In this study of the communication among fire‐ 
fighters under rapidly changing and life‐threatening conditions, almost none of 
the elements remains wholly stable. The fire is in continuous motion, as well as 
the condition of the fire‐fighters, their communication, and their equipment. 
Although the cross‐time transformations are less rapid, much the same could be 
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said of other, more recent process‐sensitive studies. This would include inquiry 
into organizational discourse, conversational processes, ethnomethods, 
dramaturgical scenarios, rituals, and so on.
However, while extending the relational emphasis in significant ways, we also 
begin to approach a ceiling. At the most basic level, the units making up the 
sequences tend to remain inviolate. The individual actors in such accounts, for 
example, continue to be treated as separate or indivisible units. In this sense, 
whatever we view as process remains as a relationship among the independent 
units. In more radical form, a process orientation would challenge the very 
conception of boundaries. If there is continuous change, there is no indivisible 
“thing” to be identified. Consider, for example, in the Mann Gulch study, one 
might say that the fire and dry grass formed an inseparably changing 
agglomeration. In the process individual identities were lost. In effect, one shifts 
focus from things in themselves to what might be viewed as a relational forming.
At this point, however, we begin to confront the limits of scholarly expression. As 
scholars we rely primarily on traditions of linguistic representation. However, a 
language of nouns and pronouns essentially presumes a world constituted by 
discrete entities. To employ the language is to construct just such a world. At the 
same time, such a vehicle of representation cannot easily be used to describe 
processes in continuous motion. One may articulate particular states or stages, 
but not the process in motion. A space is opened now for new and innovative 
orientations to theoretical intelligibility. Two such possibilities will be introduced 
later in this chapter.
 (p.59) 4.3 From observation to participation
In a science committed to independent entities, there is reason to maintain a 
clear separation between the observer and the object of observation. Objective 
knowledge depends on the capacity of the observer to report on the state or 
condition of the observed. However, as we approach the possibility of pure 
process, it becomes increasingly difficult to specify the boundaries separating 
such entities. Under these conditions the traditional view of an observational 
science breaks down. The border between subject and object is blurred. 
Preparation for such a conclusion is already extant in various corners of the 
social sciences. From Kuhn's (1962) classic work to contemporary inquiry in the 
social studies of science, it is commonly understood that the scientific observer 
does not function independently from the assumptions and values shared within 
his or her community of peers. In this sense there is no “independent” 
observation. Observation is always situated within a context of relationship. In 
effect, the independent observer melts away into communal process. At the 
same time, if the putative object of science is a communal construction—born of 
the shared paradigms or traditions of the group—then neither is there an 
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independent object. Both subject and object become outcomes of a more basic 
communal process.
From a process perspective, then, we are invited to consider alternatives to the 
view of the scientist as an observer of an independent world. Following the 
above line of reasoning, at least one promising possibility is to view the 
organizational scientist as participating within the broader processes making up 
cultural life. To engage in research is a form of cultural participation. From the 
selection of research methods, to the concepts employed in research, and the 
resulting interpretations, the scientist is effectively “making culture.” We swim 
in the river of relationship, and we cannot avoid making waves. At this point, one 
may appropriately inquire into the forms of cultural life that are sustained or 
created by various research activities. Such questions are inevitably moral and 
political in implication, as critical organizational scholars have properly 
explicated. This point is closely tied to the next.
4.4 From covering laws to co‐creating futures
If one presumes a world constituted by stable entities, one can envision a 
science dedicated to the progressive illumination of a subject matter. In  (p.60) 
traditional terms, continuing research enables the scientist to become 
increasingly accurate in making predictions concerning the nature and activity 
of such entities. On this account, the ideal result is a set of covering laws, that 
is, general laws that allow precise prediction of the phenomenon under various 
conditions. However, in a world of inherent process, this view of a progressive 
science is limited. Indeed, one may view human activity as infinitely protean. 
And given the participation of science within the cultural flow, scientific 
descriptions and explanations ineluctably alter the character of social life. For 
example, research based on the presumption of the machine‐like functioning of 
the organization may contribute to forms of organizational life that come to 
resemble a machine. In effect, social science knowledge is not cumulative in the 
sense of enabling the increased prediction and control of human behavior. It is 
essentially an agent of cultural change.
A promising alternative to the traditional aim of producing covering laws follows 
from the above vision of the scientist as a participant within the cultural flows. 
Rather than attempting to hold a “mirror up to nature” the organizational 
scientist is invited to engage in inquiry with the specific aim of transforming 
culture. At the outset this would mean inquiring into the pragmatic potential of 
given research projects. To what communities does the research contribute, and 
in what ways? No longer would it suffice to respond in terms of increments to 
knowledge. Rather, one may ask about the contributions to organizational 
functioning that might result from the research. In more radical form, the 
organizational scientist would turn from observational study to action research. 
Here the outcomes of the research are coterminous with organizational 
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transformation. Or, as it is said, “The best way to predict the future is to invent 
it”.
Further dialogue on these issues is surely required. Nor should discussion be 
limited to these. Needed, as well, are discussions of our methods of inquiry, our 
relationship with the worlds outside the scholarly domain, moral and political 
relativism, the conception of the human being, and more. Some of these 
concerns will indeed be reflected in the sections that follow.
4.5 The originary process of co‐action
I have long been concerned with the challenge of temporal process in the social 
sciences.1 The most recent adventure, however, has grown from the widely 
shared critique of Western individualism. Cadres of critics  (p.61) have 
deliberated on the ways in which this ideology fosters a sense of fundamental 
loneliness and alienation; generates a sense of pervasive doubt in oneself; 
invites one to think of oneself as the sole arbiter of what is good and evil; 
establishes a tension between self on the one hand and community on the other; 
defines relationships as secondary to the well‐being of the self; and ultimately 
encourages forms of self‐serving, narcissistic, and exploitative behavior. 
However, the major problem has been that of articulating an alternative to such 
a conception. Rather than pressing toward new visions of the human being, 
there is a tendency to revert to a pre‐modern valuing of community over 
individuals. Yet, upon closer inspection we find that a strong communalism 
suffers from many of the same problems inhabiting individualism. Both propose 
the existence of bounded or independent units in a potential relationship of 
alienation. How may we conceptualize human action, then, without division as 
its foundation? If we can do so, we move toward the possibility of process‐ 
oriented study.
In my attempt to theorize such a world, I have found it first useful to focus on 
actions that are typically attributed to individual actors. We say, for example, 
that John is aggressive, Shirley is kind, Harold is deceitful, and so on. We have, 
then, what appear to be meaningful units. However, let us ask whether one's 
behavior is aggressive if others find it playful, or whether one is kind if others 
find one's action self‐serving. Can the individual in himself possess attributes; 
can a meaningful agent exist in a social vacuum? It seems far more adequate to 
locate the attribute in the relationship between actor and other. And if this is so, 
then the identity of the unit—or the unitization—is a byproduct of an ongoing 
relational process. Let me expand on this possibility. I offer here a series of 
rudimentary propositions that place the identification of a meaningful actor, 
squarely within the relational matrix:
4.5.1 An individual's actions in themselves possess no meaning
We pass each other on the street. I smile and say, “Hello Anna.” You walk past 
without hearing. Under such conditions, what am I? To be sure, I have uttered 
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two words. However for all the difference it makes I might have stood on my 
head or offered a set of nonsense syllables. When you fail to acknowledge me in 
any way, no action has occurred. I am not an actor.
 (p.62) 4.5.2 The potential for meaningful action is realized through the 
supplementary action of another
An individual's actions begin to acquire attributes when another (or others) 
coordinate themselves to the action, that is, when they add some form of 
supplementary action (whether linguistic or otherwise). Effectively, I have 
performed a greeting in the previous case only by virtue of Anna's response. Her 
utterance, “Oh, hi, good morning …” brings me to life as one who has greeted. 
We thus find that becoming an identifiable actor is a privilege granted by others. 
If others do not treat one's utterances as meaningful, if they fail to coordinate 
themselves around the offering, one is reduced to a non‐entity. To combine these 
first two proposals, we may say that one's identification as an independent actor 
depends on coordinated action. Indeed, our entire vocabulary of the individual— 
who thinks, feels, wants, hopes, and so on—is granted meaning only by virtue of 
coordinated activities among people. Their birth of “myself” lies within the 
relationship. Or more generally, individual entities acquire their existence for us 
(or not), depending on a process of coordination.
4.5.3 Supplementary action is itself a candidate for meaning
Any supplement functions twice, first in granting significance to what has 
preceded, and second as an action that also requires supplementation. In effect, 
the meaning it grants remains suspended until it too is supplemented. Consider 
an executive who advises a colleague on a decision he should take. The 
colleague can grant the executive existence as a meaningful agent by 
responding, “Yes, I can see why this might be a good idea.” However, the 
colleague now stands idle as a meaningful agent until the executive provides a 
further supplement. If the executive ignored the statement, for example 
beginning to talk about her success as a mother, the colleague would be denied 
personhood. More broadly, we may say that in daily life there are no acts in 
themselves, that is, actions that are not simultaneously supplements to what has 
preceded. Whatever we do or say takes place within a temporal context that 
gives meaning to what has preceded, while simultaneously forming an invitation 
to further supplementation.
4.5.4 Acts and supplements are mutually constraining
If I give a lecture on organizational theory, my action is insignificant without an 
audience that listens, deliberates, affirms, or questions what  (p.63) I have said. 
In this sense, every speaker owes to his or her audience a debt of gratitude; 
without their engagement the speaker ceases to exist. At the same time, my 
lecture creates the very possibility for the audience to grant me existence as a 
meaningful agent. In this sense, the actor's identity is not free to be itself, but is 
constrained by the act of supplementation. Supplementation thus operates 
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postfiguratively, to create the speaker as a particular form of being. From the 
enormous array of possibilities, the supplement gives direction and temporarily 
narrows the possibilities of action. At the same time, however, I as lecturer grant 
to them the capacity to create me in this way. They are without existence until 
there is an action that invites them into being.
Yet, it is also important to realize that in practice, actions also set constraints 
upon the kind of supplementation that takes place. If I speak on systems theory, 
audience members are limited in their replies. One may ask me a question about 
second‐order systems, but not astrophysics, the concept of repression, or my 
taste in mushrooms. Such constraints exist because my actions are already 
embedded within a tradition of act and supplement. I have been granted 
existence as a lecturer on organizational theory, by virtue of previous 
generations of co‐actors. In this sense, actions embedded within relationships 
have prefigurative potential. The history of usage enables them to invite or 
suggest certain supplements as opposed to others—because only these 
supplements are considered intelligible within a tradition. Thus, as we speak 
with each other, we also begin to set limits on each other's being; to remain in 
the conversation is not only to respect a tradition, but to accede to being one 
kind of person as opposed to another. Each comment constrains the potentials of 
the other's being.
4.5.5 While acts/supplements are constraining, they do not determine
As proposed, our words and actions function so as to constrain the words and 
actions of others, and vice versa. If we are to remain intelligible within our 
culture, we must necessarily act within these constraints. Such constraints have 
their origins in a history of preceding co‐actions. As people coordinate actions 
and supplements, and come to rely on them in everyday life, they are essentially 
generating a way of life. If enough people join in these coordinated activities 
over a long period, we may speak of a cultural tradition. Yet, it is important to 
underscore that our words and actions function only as constraints, and not as 
determinants. This is so for two important reasons: first, the conditions under 
which we attempt to coordinate our actions are seldom constant. We are 
continuously faced with the  (p.64) challenge of importing old words and 
actions into new situations. As we do so, such words and actions ever acquire 
new possibilities for usage. More formally, we say that all words are polysemic; 
they may be used in many different ways. And, because no two situations are 
identical, there is a sense in which every word is spoken for the first time. Or 
following Heraclitus, one cannot participate in the same sentence twice.
The preceding account briefly summarizes an orientation to organizational life in 
which there is no “fundamental unit of analysis.” The defining attributes of the 
unit cannot be attached to any specific, spatio‐temporal location. Indeed, to 
designate the unit is already to enter into a flow of meaning making in such a 
way that the unit is temporarily brought into being. It is also important here to 
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point out the particular way in which I have made the case for a process out of 
which the very idea of units (persons, objects) emerge. In order to accomplish 
this I have had to rely on a language of nouns and pronouns to render an 
account of process. I have essentially described the process out of the very 
elements that the process denies existence. I cannot do otherwise by virtue of 
the fact that I rely on the English language to generate intelligibility. Thus, it is 
important to realize that I use the language in much the same way that 
Wittgenstein (1953) described the development of philosophical positions. They 
are ladders that enable me to bring the position into intelligibility, but which 
may ultimately be kicked away. In this sense, the entities employed to construct 
this process vision serve as temporary “place holders.” They are useful in 
building a vision, but once in place, their participation is no longer required.
4.6 From causality to confluence
Each thing, including each person, is first and always a nexus of relations.
Brent Slife
As proposed in the initial section of this chapter, a process orientation poses a 
challenge to traditional explanatory practices in organizational science. In 
particular, reliance on causal explanation—with its presumption of independent 
entities lodged within a system of causal interdependency—is placed in jeopardy. 
This view of causal relationships—if X then Y, if not X then not Y—has ancient 
origins. Aristotle termed it efficient causation. Centuries later, under Isaac 
Newton's influence, one could indeed begin to conceive of the universe as “one 
great machine,” with each of its  (p.65) components causally related. For every 
event there is a cause, and to imagine an “uncaused cause” is to step outside the 
realm of science. As earlier discussed, such a view laid the groundwork for a 
social science directed toward increasingly accurate prediction and control of 
human behavior.
For centuries philosophers have debated the concept of causal explanation. 
Remaining unsolved, however, are major questions concerning the nature of 
causality. Most prominent among these, how can one unit “make happen” or 
“produce” changes in another? We see the flame on the stove, and then we 
observe the boiling water. But how did the flame “make” the water boil? If you 
ask me to pass the salt, what if anything determines that I will pass the shaker? 
We are left with a mystery. As some propose, we should abandon the idea of 
causal force. Rather, we should simply confine ourselves to prediction. We can 
predict rather reliably what will happen to a pot of water placed on a flame, or a 
request for salt at a dinner party. The concept of causal determination is an 
unjustified and unnecessary addition.
There is further reason to bracket the concept of cause and effect. In significant 
ways the concept contributes to the presumption of enduring entities. When we 
search for causal explanations for a person's actions, we split the world into 
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independent entities. There are causal units on the one hand and the units that 
are affected on the other. Yet, it follows from the preceding analysis that the 
units featured as cause and effect come into being as such through a process of 
co‐action. What we term a “cause” is only so by virtue of our specifying an 
“effect.” By the same token, there are no “effects” in the world unless we can 
point to a possible cause. If one gazes at the world about, it is impossible to 
separate the causes and effects. Cause and effect are co‐constituting.
It is useful to expand on this point: you are walking by a park and see a man 
throw a ball into an open space before him. An aimless activity, you surmise, 
scarcely notable on a summer's day. Now, consider the same action when the 
ball is thrown to someone wearing a catcher's mitt. Suddenly the individual's 
action can be identified as “pitching.” In effect, there is no pitching until there is 
catching, and no catching until there is pitching. We look further to find that 
there is a man with a bat, bags that form a diamond shape, men holding mitts in 
the field, and so on. At this point we might justifiably conclude that this is a 
“baseball game.” What we traditionally view as “independent” elements—the 
man with the bat, the bags, the men in the field—are not meaningfully 
independent. They are all mutually defining. A man standing alone in the field 
wearing a mitt would not be  (p.66) playing baseball, nor would the bags 
constitute a game. Alone they would be virtually without meaning. It is when we 
bring all these elements into a mutually defining relationship that we can speak 
about “playing baseball.” Let us then speak of the baseball game as a 
confluence, a form of life in this case that is constituted by an array of mutually 
defining “entities.”
Let us further enrich this analytic space. In particular, it can be useful to view 
each of the “entities” as an arrested moment in what we may term a vector. The 
baseball player appears as a unit within the game, but he is effectively in 
process. He is not the same human who entered the playing field, nor will he be 
the same person who departs. His playing the game is ultimately a “moment” in 
the vector of what minimally can be viewed as a life cycle transformation. 
Similarly, the batter holds an object that was once a growing tree, then cut and 
trimmed, and placed into service. At some point it may be consumed by flames. 
It serves as a “bat” by virtue of the way it is co‐constituted in the moment of the 
game. In this way we can view the game as a whole as a historically contingent 
period in which all the mutually defining “entities” are—relatively speaking— 
momentarily arrested.
Here we have a preliminary sketch of an approach to understanding 
organizational process. The identification of the independent units is always in 
terms of their co‐constitution within a confluence. And, as all “components” of 
the confluence are vectoring across time, they shift their “thing‐ness” along with 
the continuous transformation of the relational configuration. If the contours of 
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such a formulation could be developed more fully, what would it mean for 
organizational understanding and practice. I briefly consider three possibilities.
4.6.1 The explanation of action
At the outset, in our attempts to understand organizational life, we may replace 
causal explanation with a confluence‐based orientation. We may replace the 
metaphors of billiard balls and unmoved movers with the metaphors of baking or 
doing chemistry. The concern now shifts from isolated entities to the 
combination of ingredients. With a combination of flour, oil, eggs, milk, and a 
griddle, we bring about a pancake. By compounding hydrogen and oxygen atoms 
we have water. From this standpoint, a lighted match does not cause the 
combustion of gasoline; rather the combustion is the achievement of a particular 
combination of flame, gasoline vapors, and oxygen. In the same way, what 
scholars might  (p.67) define as an intellectual attack does not cause another to 
argue; the argument comes into being only when another responds with a 
defense.
In terms of organizational practice, this would mean redirecting attention from 
single entities to the relational confluence making up the whole. It is not the 
traits of the individual that count, for example, but the nature of the relational 
process into which the individual fits (and which might subsequently be altered 
by his or her presence). It is not the characteristics of a given machine 
technology, a benefits package, a new business opportunity, or a new office 
building that should rivet our attention, but the character which these “entities” 
acquire as they are insinuated into a particular confluence. Operationally, a 
sensitivity to confluence would seemingly invite more democratic workplace 
practices. Whether a given “entity” fits comfortably and productively within the 
confluence will vitally depend on the supplemental actions of the organizational 
participants.
4.6.2 Future building
As proposed, a confluence orientation is designed as an analytic companion to a 
process approach to organizations. It must first be noted, however, that there is 
nothing about a process orientation, or confluence theory in particular, that 
rules out prediction. Most commonly, the process of co‐action will tend toward 
reliable or repeated forms of relationship. Consider the game of golf. We can 
predict reasonably well what club most players will select when their ball is in a 
sand trap, or when they find their ball is several inches from the cup. The 
confluence of “playing golf” is a longstanding and repetitive tradition, and its 
rules effectively reinforced. In this sense, the game functions as a relatively 
closed system. It is relatively insulated from changes in the larger culture of 
which it is a part. Most organizations do not enjoy such tranquility. The 
conditions of organizational life are in continuous motion, and with the increased 
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speed and magnitude in the flow of information and people across the globe, the 
rapidity and complexity of change will only increase.
From a confluence standpoint, attention recedes from attempting to predict the 
future to actively creating it. Within the organization, for example, the emphasis 
on generating predictions of the market, and planning accordingly, would 
recede. Attention would be directed, instead, to asking how one might generate 
favorable market conditions. Organizational scientists, in this case, would be 
less given to assessing “the way organizations function” than to asking, for 
example, how they might help  (p.68) to create a particular kind of 
organization. In effect, the challenge of the organizational specialist shifts from 
describing and explaining what exists, to aiding in the construction of what 
could exist.
4.6.3 From progress to protean potentials
Related to the discussion of future building, a confluence orientation suggests a 
shift in approach to organizational development. In keeping with the modernist 
vision of infinite progress, one typically views the organization in terms of its 
potential for infinite strengthening and expansion. However, this view is closely 
linked to the traditional scientific view of prediction and control of identifiable 
entities. With today's increasing consciousness of the environmental threat 
posed by the view of infinite progress, many analysts and practitioners turn their 
attention to sustainability. While attractive in certain respects, the sustainability 
metaphor is again limited in its presumption of an identifiable entity—this time 
one that reaches an optimal form of stability.
From a confluence orientation, however, we may dispense both with infinite 
progress or stabilization of the organization. Rather, it is useful to view 
organizational processes in terms of their protean potentials. How capable is the 
organization in reforming itself as the conditions of confluence shift over time? 
Rather than emphasizing the core business that one is attempting to develop 
and/or sustain, for example, one may inquire into the various ways in which it 
may be redirected, retooled, or re‐imagined, such that different opportunities 
may be explored. Cell phone technology provides an excellent example in this 
case, as an object originally designed to be a phone rapidly becomes a camera, a 
game board, an internet outlet, an alarm clock, a geographic position finder, and 
much more. In effect, the cell phone business has continued to morph over time, 
reforming with the changing technological and market conditions. By the same 
token, one may inquire into the necessity of building fixed structures, 
purchasing large pieces of equipment, establishing fixed operating procedures, 
or designating fixed job descriptions. All may represent reductions in protean 
potential.
Co‐Constitution, Causality, and Confluence: Organizing in a World without Entities
Page 13 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 12 August 2020
4.7 Parting words
The preceding discussion has attempted to wrestle with the implications of 
“taking process seriously.” Although world conditions today favor a shift in 
organizational studies toward a process orientation, there are also  (p.69) 
significant challenges to be confronted. Not only are many of the assumptions of 
the empiricist orientation to inquiry placed in jeopardy, but it proves difficult to 
conceptualize pure process in terms of the linguistic resources at our disposal. 
The preceding discussions represent exploratory steps in the direction of 
theorizing process. In the account of co‐action, we began to see how relational 
process could bring about the conception of objects or persons as “entities.” In 
effect, process preceded essences. In the account of confluence, the relational 
account was expanded. Rather than focusing on the relational dance of co‐ 
action, we began to see how an entire array of mutually defining “entities” could 
be formed. The emphasis on the confluence leads us into further speculations 
about organizational inquiry and action. It must finally be underscored, however, 
that these attempts are in no way thrusts toward conclusions. Rather, my 
greatest hope is to invite further discussion. And applying the theory of co‐ 
action, such discussion need never reach a conclusion.
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